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Regulation vs. the Market:
The Case of Bicycle Safety [Part I]*
Ross D. Petty**
Introduction
The debate on whether the market or government intervention in the
market is the most effective way to address particular social problems is
as old as it is controversial. Advocates on either side criticize the other
approach and then declare their approach to be preferable, often without
examining their preferred approach's effectiveness. Seldom, if ever, has
anyone compared the approaches simultaneously and independently of
one another. This article does so, albeit on the narrow topic of bicycle
safety. The market approach to bicycle safety is represented by the
development and marketing of the hardshell bicycle helmet. 1 The
* Part II of this article will appear in the Spring issue.
** Ross D. Petty received his B.A. and M.B.A. from the University of Rochester,
his J.D. from the University of Michigan, and an M.P.A. from Harvard University.
He is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at Babson College.
He wishes to thank John Williams for comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 The term hardshell bicycle helmet includes the recently developed "no shell"
helmets that are constructed of expanded polystyrene as well as similar helmets that
also include a hard plastic shell. Both pass helmet safety standards and can be
contrasted with "leather hairnets" that offer virtually no impact protection. See Bike
Helmets: Unused Lifesavers, Consumer Reports 348 (May 1990); Swart, Hard
Facts About Bicycle Helmets, 1 Cycling Science 14 (Dec. 1988); D'Ambrosio,
The Shell Game, 14 BikeReport 13 (Jun. 1988) and sources cited at notes 58-60,
infra. While a question has been raised concerning whether "no shell" helmets
momentarily adhere to the ground on impact thereby increasing the likelihood of neck
or spinal injuries, such helmets are too new to have a significant effect on the data
presented here. See V. HODGSON, IMPACT, SKID, AND RETENTION TESTS ON A
R ESENTATIVE GROUP OF BICYCLE HELMETS TO DETERMIm THEIR HEAD-NECK
PROTECION CHARACTERISTICS (1990) (finding increased probability of neck injury
from no-shell helmets over hardshells at low angle skids), and Martin, Are Foam
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intervention approach is represented by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission's (CPSC) bicycle safety standard.2 After this case study
is presented, lessons are drawn which contribute to the more general
debate on whether allowing the market to function or enacting
government regulation is better for addressing perceived problems.
It is appropriate to examine the CPSC here, because the agency itself
was formed out of this debate. In 1970, the President's Commission on
Product Safety issued its Final Report. It noted that twenty million
Americans are injured, and 30,000 die, annually as a result of incidents
connected with consumer products. It estimated that the annual cost of
product-related injuries may exceed $5.5 billion. 3 The chairman told
Congress that an effective agency could prevent as many as four million
injuries and as many as 6,000 product related deaths each year.4
Only Helmets Safe?, 30 Bicycling 28-29 (Feb. 1989). But see Zahradnik, Helmet
Buyer's Guide, 30 Bicycling 160-61 (May 1989)(Bell helmets tested foam only
helmets on simulated road surfaces and found no appreciable differences with hardshell
helmets).
2 There are many other, less intrusive, efforts taken by the federal government to.
promote bicycle safety. These include co-sponsoring conferences, preparing studies
and funding projects at the state and local level. See, e.g., Baldwin, Federal Bicycle
Programs and Projects, 1 Bicycle Forum 30 (Spr. 1978), and Baldwin, Federal
Funds for Bicycles, 2 Bicycle Forum 31 (Fall 1978). Even the Federal Trade
Commission has contributed to bicycle safety through its acceptance of a consent
agreement with a bicycle manufacturer that agreed to cease showing children riding in
an unsafe manner in its advertising, and to produce two bicycle safety messages and
distribute them to specified television stations across the country. See AMF, Inc.,
95 F.T.C. 310 (1980).
3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 1 (1970). More
recently, the CPSC has estimated that consumer products are associated with 32
million injuries and 28,000 deaths annually, costing an estimated $10 billion in
emergency room treatment alone. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,
ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986.
4 36 CONG. Q. 389 (1978). The first Chairman of the CPSC, Richard 0.
Simpson, testified in 1976 that the "standards-preventable" portion of product
associated injuries was between 15 and 25%. Federal Regulation and Regulatory
Reform: Hearings Before The Subcomm. On Oversight And Investigations Of The
House Comm. On Interstate And Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
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The Final Report was strongly criticized by Walter Oi.5 He argued
that the Commission's implicit goal of minimizing aggregate costs of
injuries related to products is inconsistent with the maximization of
consumer welfare. Rather, he suggested that the rational consumer
would seek to minimize the sum of accident costs and accident
prevention costs. Thus, consumers occasionally choose to purchase
risky products even if there are less risky alternatives available. For this
reason, Oi strongly opposed any restriction on product choice through
bans on unsafe products or safety standards. Oi did admit that the
market probably undersupplies safety information and therefore there
may be a role for the government in the provision or subsidization of
safety information.6
The debate continues well after the CPSC's creation, and its actions
have fueled the fires of both sides. Only three studies have examined the
CPSC's effects on across-the-board product safety. All three are limited
because they examine only home accident rates rather than consumer
product injuries, and none control for effects from products liability
lawsuits. The first, released by the Consumer Federation of America,
examined household accidental deaths and injuries data collected by the
National Safety Council. It found that, for the nine years prior to the
establishment of the CPSC, injuries fell 11% and deaths fell 13%. For
the nine years after the CPSC, injuries fell 28% and deaths, 27%. 7
This study is flawed in several respects: it fails to account for other
factors that may account for these trends; it does not analyze the
(1976).
5 Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL J. ECON. 4 (1973).
6 'Id. See also Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social
Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety,
6 YALE J. REG. 65, 74-75 (1989).
7 Lower, Averyt and Greenberg, On the Safe Track: Deaths and Injuries Before
and After The Consumer Product Safety Commission 1, 4 (unpublished report of
the Consumer Federation of America, Sept. 15, 1983).
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statistical significance of the results; and it measures household injuries
and deaths rather than product related injuries and deaths. In contrast, a
CPSC study found that product related injuries had increased 44% in its
first five years of operation. 8
Kip Viscusi attempted to correct these flaws by performing a
multivariate statistical analysis using a simple lagged linear model of
factors likely to affect the overall home accident rate as reported by the
National Center for Health Statistics. He found that the CPSC dummy
variable was not statistically significant, and the largest coefficient he
obtained for that variable indicated that the CPSC had only a 4%
reduction in the injury rate. He found only two variables to be
statistically significant: real per capita consumption and the lagged home
accident rate.9
Viscusi's study was criticized by Zick, Mayer and Snow.10 They
disagreed with his formulation of a linear model and instead proposed
an exponential model that would allow for the effects of the CPSC to
increase over time. They also included the unemployment rate to control
for certainty of income and two measures of population age: those under
14 and those over 64.11 In contrast, Viscusi controlled only for
persons under five.
Zick et al. performed regression analysis on the natural log of their
exponential function and found a statistically significant relationship that
explained 86% of the total variance. 12 While the unemployment rate
8 See EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS ON CONSUMER PROTECTIONS GAINS AND
SETBACKS 8 (Feb. 17, 1978).
9 Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety
Regulation, 28 J. L. & EcON. 527, 531-34 (1985); W. ViSCUSI, REULATJNG
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 71-73 (1984).
10 Zick, Mayer & Snow, Does the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Make a Difference? An Assessment of Its First Decade, 6 J. CONS. POL'Y. 25,
27-28 (1986).
11 Id. at 30-32.
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and the proportion of population over 64 were not statistically
significant, the other variables, income (which they assert is comparable
to Viscusi's consumption variable), proportion of the population under
age 14 and the CPSC were statistically significant. The authors conclude
that over the 1973-82 period, CPSC accounted for saving an estimated
17,941 lives or about 7% of the deaths caused by home accidents during
that time period.13 Thus, Viscusi and Zick et al. agree that CPSC has
not yet achieved its goal of a 20% reduction in injuries and deaths, but
they disagree on whether it has had any significant effect.
There are two interesting differences between these two studies in
addition to those discussed above. Viscusi used the national home
accident rate as the dependent variable and analyzed data from 1933
through 1981 and 1949 through 1981. He used the lagged home
accident rate as an independent variable to avoid serial correlation
problems. 14 In contrast, Zick et al. found that national time series data
like that used in the other two studies resulted in multicollinearity
problems with their control variables. They therefore used accidental
home death rates for ten randomly selected states and dummy variables
to control for differences between the states. 15 This is a rather unusual
solution to multicollinearity. 16 It is not clear how state data solves the
problem.
The second interesting difference is the formulation of the CPSC
dummy variable. Viscusi used a simple dummy variable which had a
value of one from 1973 to 1981 and zero prior to 1973.17 Zick et al.
12 Id. at 34.
13 Id. at 34-38. They also conclude that by failing to control for other variables,
the Consumer Federation study overestimated the effect of the CPSC by 155%. Id.
at 36.
14 Viscusi, supra note 9, at 532.
15 Zick et al., supra note 10, at 29 n.1, and 33.
16 See, e.g., P. KENNEDY, A GUIDETO ECONOMETRICS 150-52 (1985).
17 Viscusi, supra note 9, at 533.
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felt that CPSC effects would increase over time as consumers gradually
replaced less safe products with those satisfying CPSC standards. They
therefore used an exponential dummy variable. The variable had a value
of one in 1973 and ten in 1982.18 It is far from clear that this
relationship is the proper one to account for the CPSC's increased effect
over time, but their results are quite robust.
Other studies of the CPSC focus on particular rules. For example,
Viscusi examines CPSC rules on mattress flammability, child resistant
caps, cribs, swimming pool slides, floor coverings and bicycles. He
also discusses cost benefit analyses of CPSC rules on matchbooks,
architectural glazing, power lawn mowers, space heaters, and urea
formaldehyde foam insulation. 19 In contrast, other authors have
praised CPSC rules. 20 Lastly, some have criticized amendments to the
Consumer Product Safety Act that require the CPSC to rely on
voluntary standards where feasible.2 1
None of these analyses compare a CPSC safety standard with a
corresponding market effort to address the same problem with the
18 Zick et al., supra note 10, at 31.
19 W. Viscusi, supra note 9, at 71-101. For other critical analyses of CPSC
rules, see also Kafoglis, Matchbook Safety, in BENEFIT-COST ANALYSES OF SOCIAL
REGULATION 75 (J. Miller & B. Yandle eds. 1979); Lenard, Lawn Mower Safety, in
id.; and Linneman, Effects of Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973 Mattress
Flammability Standard, 23 J. L. & ECON. 461 (1980).
20 See, e.g., J. CLAYBROOK ET AL., RETREAT FROM SAFETY 58-70 (1984); M.
GRExN & N. WArrZMAN, BUSINESS WAR ON Tim LAW: AN ANALYSIS OFTHE BENEFTS
OF FEDEPAL HEALTH,/AFETY ENFORCEMENT 156-67 (1981). These analyses appear to
be largely based on the CPSC's own estimates of its rules' benefits and costs. Such
estimates have often been criticized as biased. See sources supra note 19.
21 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (1982). For general criticism see Adler, From "Model
Agency" to Basket Case - Can the Consumer Product Safety Commission Be
Redeemed? 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 92-106 (1989). For criticism for reliance on
specific voluntary standards including those for all terrain vehicles, cigarette lighters,
bunk beds, DEHP, swimming pool covers, and baby pacifiers, see M. FISE, THE
CPSC: GUIDING OR HIDING FROM PRODUCT SAFETY (Consumer Federation of
America, 1987).
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possible exception of the mattress flammability analysis. Linneman's
analysis of the mattress flammability standard noted that large mattress
manufacturers had already reduced flammability by the time the rule
became effective. The result of the rule then was simply to force small
manufacturers out of business, resulting in only a marginal decrease in
flammability. 22 Since the rule was under consideration for some time,
it is difficult to determine whether the market, without any suggestion of
government regulation, would have led to the same result.
General Background on Bicycle Risks
The CPSC's interest in bicycles is based on the fact that bicycles are
associated with more consumer injuries than nearly any other consumer
product. For example, in 1981, the only "product" associated with more
injuries than bicycles was steps and stairs.2 3 In 1986, the CPSC
Directorate for Economic Analysis estimated the cost of bicycle related
injuries and deaths to be $7.2 billion.24
Each year over one-half million injuries associated with bicycles are
estimated to have occurred based on the CPSC's National Electronic
Injury Surveillance System. Data is collected for NEISS through
hospital emergency rooms. The CPSC further estimates that
approximately 610,000 other bicycle related injuries were treated in
other medical settings.2 5
22 Linneman, supra note 19, at 474-79.
23 U.S. CONSUMERPRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1982).
24 U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, 1990 PRIORITY PROJECT
RECOMMENDATIONS, section on FY 1990 PRIORITY PROJECTS - Conducting A
Bicycle Injury And Exposure Survey (May 9, 1988), cited in, PETITION OF THE
CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA ET AL., To ESTABLISH A MANDATORY SAFETY
STANDARD FOR ADULT AND CilLD BICYCLE HELMETS 7-8 (May 15, 1989) ($2
million for each death, $2.3 billion for emergency room treated injuries, and $2.5
billion for other medically treated injuries).
25 Id. Kenneth Cross estimates that because NEISS does not include student health
care facilities, it may underestimate the total number of serious bicycle-associated
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Contrary to popular fears, most bicycle-associated injuries are not
related to motor vehicle collisions. According to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), there were only 88,000 police-
reported car-bicycle accidents in 1986. 1,000 of these were fatalities,
12,000 were hospitalized and 45,000 received some other medical
treatment:26 The National Safety Council estimates from reports by city
and state traffic authorities that in 1988 there were 58,000 non-fatal
injuries and 1,100 deaths from "pedalcycle"-motor vehicle collisions.27
John Forester estimates that bicycle-motor vehicle and bicycle-bicycle
collisions each count for another 18% and the remainder result from
collisions with other objects including dogs (14%) or just plain falls
(50%).28 Kenneth Cross attributes bicycle-motor vehicle accidents as
injuries by as much as 27%. K. CRoss, BICYCLE-SAFETY EDUCATION - FACTS AND
IssuEs 24 (1978).
Those accidents that result in only minor injuries are not reported to medical
facilities or to the police or insurance authorities. Thus, the vast majority of bicycle
accidents are likely not to be reported at all. A recent study by the Madison,
Wisconsin Traffic Engineering Department found that 2,800 adult bicyclists were
involved in accidents in 1985. Only 300 or so of those accidents were reported to the
police. 12 BikeReport 4 (Oct./Nov. 1986). Similarly, a North Carolina study of 648
accidents reported to hospital emergency rooms in 1985 and 1986 showed that only
10% were reported to the police. J. STUTTS ET AL., BICYCLE ACCIDENTS: AN
EXAMINATION OF HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM REPORTS AND COMPARISON WITH
POLICE ACCIDENT DATA 10 (Univ. N. Carolina Highway Safety Research Center,
1988). 1
26 U.S. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMSTRATION, THE NATIONAL
AcCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM 42-43 (1986)[hereinafter NASS]. Motor vehicle
accidents tend to be more severe than non-motor vehicle accidents. See Flora &
Abbott, National Trends in Bicycle Accidents, 11 J. SAFETY RES. 20, 26 (1979)(7%
of the severe accidents involve motor vehicles compared to 3% in the total sample).
27 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 73 (1988). Pedalcycles include
sidewalk bicycles and tricycles which are not included in the NHTSA figures.
28 j. FORESTER, BICYCLE TRANSPORTATION 84 (1983). STUTTS ET AL., supra note
25, at 3, review reported hospital emergency room studies from around the country
and indicate that the proportion of bicycle related injuries occurring from motor
vehicle collisions ranges from 13-50%. Australian figures show 70-80% of bicycle
crashes do not involve motor vehicles. Boughton & Broadbent, Bicycle Safety
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causing only 5.5% of all bicycle-related injuries and Dan Burden
suggests that such accidents cause only 1% of all bicycle related
accidents. 29 The differences in these estimates may result from the base
number of accidents. If minor, unreported falls are included, bicycle-
motor vehicle accidents account for a much smaller proportion of
accidents than they do as a proportion of serious accidents. 30
The primary cause of bicycle-associated injuries is operator error.
Forester estimates that one-half of all bicycle accidents result from
this.31 A recent survey, at the University of Kansas Medical Center, of
492 bicyclists involved in accidents reported that 59% considered
themselves to be at fault.32 Even simple misjudgments can cause
significant falling injuries because bicycles are inherently unstable and
provide little protection to operators. 33
Despite the relatively large number of annual bicycle-associated
injuries, only about 1 in 500 emergency room-treated injuries is a
fatality.34 The NHTSA counted 949 police-reported bicyclist fatalities
Current Knowledge in BiKESAFE 86 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 15, 29 (Fed. Dept.
of Transportation ed. 1987).
29 K. CRoss, supra note 25, at 22 and Burden, Bicycle Accident Facts, 1 Bicycle
Forum 12, 13 (Spr. 1978).
30 In contrast to the cause of accidents, most bicycle injuries are caused by impact
with the ground. Even in bicycle-motor vehicle accidents, 60% of the most severe
bicyclist injuries are caused by impact with the ground. NASS, supra note 26, at
42.
31 J. FORESTER, supra note 28, at 84.
32 Kiburz et al., Bicycle Accidents and Injuries Among Adult Cyclists, 14 AM. J.
SPORTS MED. 416 (1986), reported in 28 Bicycling 22-3 (Apr. 1987). See also
Flora & Abbott, supra note 26, at 25 (Of 581 serious injury cases investigated by
the CPSC, 51% were primarily caused by operator error).
33 P. HILL, BICYCLE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.4 & 1.5 (1986). Cf. DeLong,
Bicycle Stability, 13 Bicycling 12 (May 1972) and Jones, The Stability of the
Bicycle, Physics Today 34 (Apr. 1970).
34 Interestingly, there is a negative correlation between the annual number of
NEISS bicycle injuries and the annual number of NHTSA bicycle related deaths. The
Spearman correlation coefficient is -0.66 and is significant at the 98% confidence
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in 1986 from bicycle-motor vehicle collisions. 35 The National Safety
Council estimated 1,100 pedal cyclist fatalities occurred from motor
vehicle collisions in that year.36 The National Center for Health
Statistics counts 92 pedal cyclist fatalities from non-motor vehicle
accidents. 37 In contrast to non-fatal injuries, about 90% of all bicycle-
associated fatalities occur from automobile collisions.38
Moreover, head injuries appear to be the major cause of fatalities. In
an early study, Dr. Daniel Fife et al. examined 173 fatally injured
bicyclists in Dade County, Florida between 1956 and 1979. They found
that the head and neck region was most seriously injured in 86% of the
cases. 39 Similarly, the Calgary study found that 67% of bicycle
fatalities were caused by head injuries, and an Australian study estimates
that 80-85% of all bicycle fatalities are caused by head injuries. 40 Of
level. One possible explanation for this relationship is the inaccuracy of NEISS or of
both systems.
35 U.S. NATIONAL HIGHWAY SAFETY TRAFFIC. ADMINISTRATION, THE FATAL
ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM Ch. 8 at 9 (1987) [hereinafter FARS].
36 NATIONAL SAFETY COuNCiL, supra note 27, at 73 (1988).
37 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, VOL. II, MORTALITY, PART A at 198 (1986) (10 pedestrians and 8
unspecified people were also killed in pedalcycle accidents not involving motor
vehicles).
38 Cf. K. CROSS, supra note 25, at 21 (82%). In Australia, 87% of bicyclist
fatalities involve motor vehicle collisions. Boughton & Broadbent, supra note 28, at
24.
39 Fife et al., Fatal Injuries to Bicyclists: The Experience of Dade County,
Florida, 23 J. TRAUMA 745, 746 (1983). None of the bicyclists were wearing
helmets, and all were injured from a collision with a car.
40 Guichon & Myles, Bicycle Injuries: One Year Sample in Calgary, 15 J.
TRAUMA 504-6 (1975), and N. GILIES, HELMETS FOR USE BY BICYCLE RIDERS 5
(Traffic Accident Research Unit, Department of Motor Transport, New South Wales
March 1980). According to the NHTSA, 70% of all motorcycle fatalities are caused
by head injuries. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISIRAION, STATE AND
COMMUNITY PROGRAM AREA REPORT, MOTORCYCLE SAFETY 1984-85 at 3 (1985),
When the requirement that states enact mandatory motorcycle helmet use laws was
repealed in 1976, motorcycle fatalities increased 48% in four years - from 3,312 in
1976 to 5,144 in 1980. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, A
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course, not all head injuries are fatalities - or even serious. A recent
study of 100 bicyclists with head injuries in Great Britain found that
only 11 were admitted to a hospital for treatment and only one died.41
As Table 142 shows, annual bicycle injury and fatality rates per
participant in the U.S. are comparatively low. Still, non-fatal injuries are
quite frequent. Some estimate that one in every 20 bicyclists is injured
annually.4 3 A bicyclist can expect a minor injury every three years and
a more serious one every fifteen.44
In Part 1H, this article will provide further background on the CPSC
safety standard and hardshell bicycle helmets. Then it will present a
regression model for analyzing the safety effects of the standard and the
use of helmets. Following the presentation of the results of such an
analysis, it will discuss and compare these results for both regulation
and the market, as well as draw conclusions.
REPORTTO CONGRESS ONTHE EFFECr Op MOTORCYCLE USE LAW REPEAL - A CASE
FOR HELMEr USE at IV-2 (1980).
41 Worrell, Head Injuries in Pedal Cyclists: How Much Protection Will Help? 78
IMuRY 56 (1987).
42 Data is derived primarily from NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL, supra note 27, at
83. That for smoking and mountaineering are from Morrall, A Review of the
Record, 10 REGuLATION 25-27 (1986). Data for bicycling and all terrain vehicles are
derived from other sources. See supra notes 24 and 35; infra notes 79 and 109
43 28 Bicycling 23 (Apr. 1987). This estimate is consistent with data in Table 1
under the assumption that it represents only 10% of all injuries.
44 1 Bicycle Forum 45 (Spr. 1978).
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Table 1
Annual Fatalities and Injuries
Activity MMParticipants Fatalities FIP Injuries I/P
Smoking
Mountaineering
Hang Gliding
Parachuting
Hunting
Scuba Diving
All Accidents
ATVs
Boating
Swimming
Driving
Bicycling
Boxing
Football
Basketball
Baseball
Soccer
145
0.06
0.03
0.11
1.69
1.6
2,360
6.7
38.2
102
2,400
85
0.5
12
21.2
13.9
8.2
345,000
34
13
30
280
70
92,911
240
1,066
2,300
47,900
1400
4
12
7
2
1
3,000
567
433
269
166
43.8
39.3
35.8
27.9
22.5
19.9
16.5
8
1
0.3
0.14
0.012
2,200
86,400
2,847
96,934
525,027
5,668
362,016
418,989
395,073
103,21.2
7.67
12,900
75
950
6,176
11,340
30,200
19,763
28,400
12,600
